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(112 words)
Using DHS data for 22 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is found that average
educational level in the community (DHS cluster) has a significant depressing effect
on a woman’s birth rates, net of urbanization and her own education. According to
simulations, average fertility for these countries would be 1.00 lower if education
were expanded from the current level in the region to the relatively high level in
Kenya. Excluding aggregate education from the model leaves a response of only 0.52.
A considerable aggregate contribution is estimated even when several potential
determinants of education are included. This illustrates the need to consider aggregate
education in future assessments of the total impact of education.
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(204 words)
Discrete-time hazard models for first- and higher-order births are estimated from DHS
data for 22 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for the 1990s.  It is found that, among
women with the same number of completed years of schooling, fertility decreases
with increasing average educational level in the neighborhood (DHS cluster). Such a
significant community effect, net of urbanization, has never been documented before.
W hen the aggregate variable is left out of the m odel, som e of its effect is captured by
the individual variable, but only a small part. One may therefore be led to conclude
that investments in education are much less powerful in reducing fertility than they
really are. For example, a simulation based on a model including only individual
education reveals that average fertility for these 22 countries would have been 0.52
lower if education were expanded from the current level in the region to that in
Kenya, which is the most advanced country in this respect. However, according to a
m odel where also average education is included, the drop would have been as large as
1.00, of which 0.38 is the purely individual effect. A considerable aggregate
contribution is estimated even when several potential determinants of education are
entered into the models.
4(M ain text 7563 words)
Although women’s education has been one of the most thoroughly studied
determinants of fertility, with the perspective now often extended to include the
closely related ’women’s position’, important questions still cry for a better answer.
Not only do we have quite meager knowledge about the importance of various causal
channels that education operates through. Even the assessments of total effects, in
different settings and on the whole, are quite inadequate.
One rather trivial reason for this is that many studies have disregarded factors
that influence both education and fertility, such as the degree of urbanization (see e.g.
reviews by  Diamond, Newby and Varle 1999; Eloudou-Enyegue 1999). As a parallel
to this, Desai and Alva (1998) reported that the effects of maternal education on child
health and mortality, which have long been reckoned as extraordinarily clear, are
much weaker when some structural characteristics and individual background factors
are taken into account. Besides, variables causally subsequent to education have often
been included in regression models, which is no better when the intention is to
estim ate a total effect.
The other reason for inadequate assessment of the total effect is that
community effects usually are ignored. It is possible that the educational level among
people in the neighborhood has an effect on a woman’s fertility above and beyond
that of her own education. Uneducated women who live in societies where a large
proportion are literate, or where the average educational level is high, m ay have a
fertility different from that of uneducated wom en elsewhere. In addition, also the
better-educated may be influenced by the educational distribution in the community.
If aggregate education has, on the whole, a substantial depressing effect, fertility may
decline much steeper in response to an increase in women’s education than suggested
by a model that only includes individual-level effects.
Caldwell (1980) discussed the possible importance of ’m ass education’ many
years ago, and concluded that near-universal enrollment of children in primary school
probably is a key factor behind fertility decline. The mechanisms he addressed can be
classified largely as aggregate-level effects. However, in the 20 years that have
elapsed, little em pirical research has been devoted to aggregate education effects.
Some efforts were made on the basis of community data collected in the
W orld Fertility Surveys in a few countries, but with the focus largely on the number
5of schools in the vicinity (reviewed in Casterline 1985). In an important recent
contribution of a similar type, Axinn and Barber (2001) showed that a woman’s use of
modern contraception depended on the distance to school both in childhood and
adulthood (and partly because of its influence on her own children’s schooling).
Also the education that has actually been taken by other people in the
community has been considered in some studies. For example, Tienda, Diaz and
Smith (1985) found effects of average length of education on cumulated fertility in
Peru, net of the woman’s own education. In a Kenyan study, Lesthaeghe et al. (1985)
showed such net effects of aggregate education both on cumulated fertility and some
proximate determinants. M oreover, Hirschman and Guest (1990) estimated a
significant fertility-inhibiting effect of the proportion of women with post-primary
education in four Southeast Asian countries. Unfortunately, a control for urbanization
was not included in any of these studies. A recent analysis from  Zim babwe showed
that, when such a variable was entered into the m odels, the effects of com m unity
education disappeared completely (Kravdal 2000). In fact, an effect of the educational
level in the neighborhood on actual fertility, net of urbanization and the woman’s own
education, is still not statistically documented. Thomas (1999) wrote that he had
found mean educational level to reduce cumulated fertility among South African
women, but did not show the size of this effect. M oreover, the significant effect that
appeared in a study from Bangladesh (Amin, Diamond and Steele 1996) was for
contraceptive use, not actual fertility.
The objective of this study is to estimate how education has influenced birth
rates in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s through both individual- and aggregate-level
effects, and to illustrate the consequences of neglecting the latter when assessing the
total impact of education. All countries with an easily available Demographic and
Health Survey held after 1992 are included. The focus is on births two years before
the survey, and models are estimated separately for first and higher-order births,
because of the fundamentally different behavioral mechanisms involved. Simulation
is used to show how changes in educational distribution affect total fertility.
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A brief review of suggested individual-level effects of education
6There are several plausible reasons why women with, for example, some secondary
education usually display a lower fertility than the uneducated. To summarize very
briefly (and without showing any literature references for these standard arguments),
fertility desires have been thought to be influenced by the individual woman’s
education because of: i) the high opportunity costs of childbearing involved in some
types of work that may be offered the better-educated women, ii) the cash expenses
and children’s reduced contribution to domestic and agricultural work as a result of
children’s schooling, which tends to be encouraged by educated mothers, iii) the
reduced need for children as old age security, or to support the woman even as a
relatively young widow, when the family’s wealth allows other kinds of savings, or
when the woman is able to earn a living on her own and even set something of that
aside for the future, iv) a stronger desire am ong the better-educated to spend more
time caring for a child and to invest more in each child, not only in term s of
education, v) a higher prevalence of nucleated families, which may reduce fertility
partly because childbearing costs to a larger extent m ust be covered by parents, vi) a
stronger preference for consumer goods or other sources of satisfaction, and vii) a
lower infant and child mortality, influencing desires through replacem ent and
insurance effects. These fertility-inhibiting effects may be set off against viii) a
possibly stimulating impact of a higher purchasing power resulting from educated
women’s own work or their marriage into a relatively rich family.1
M ortality has a bearing also on the supply side. Besides supply and regulation
are likely to be influenced by education, one way or the other, because of ix) the
higher age at marriage among the better-educated, x) their knowledge about and
accept for modern contraception, and their ability to use it efficiently, as well as their
more efficient use of traditional methods because of better knowledge about their own
body, xi) the erosion of traditional norms about post-partum sexual abstinence and
breastfeeding that is supposed to go hand in hand with education, and xii) their higher
fecundity because of better health or treatment for sexually transmitted diseases. As
widely known, the fertility-stimulating effects actually seem to have been dominant at
a moderate educational level in many countries, and in particular in Africa during the
1970s and early 1980s.
One reason why education may operate through these channels is that schooling
generally (disregarding variations in curriculum, resources and teacher attitudes)
7m akes the women able to read and write, increases their knowledge about the outside
world, and provides them  with certain practical and theoretical skills that enhance
their productivity.2 In addition, women’s position relative to men may be involved.
W hile their ‘economic autonom y’, ‘physical autonom y’ and ‘decision-making
autonom y’ (using terms from Jejeebhoy 1995) are likely to depend to a large extent
on community norms and rules and institutional structures, there may also be
individual variations determ ined by individual factors, such as education and each
family’s interpretation of the cultural proscriptions (see e.g. Niraula and M organ
1996). In other words, her own current position compared to men, and the position
she expects for the future and for her daughters, are probably determined both by
gender attitudes and structures in society and such individual characteristics as her
own education. If she has an education, she may, for example, be allowed by the
family to work outside the house and more often be heard in discussions with husband
or in-laws.3 This will add to the effect of her literacy and skills and possibly reduce
fertility desires through such factors as opportunity costs, old age security concerns
and child mortality.
W omen’s status may also operate through channels other than those listed
above. For example, in situations where the husband wants more children than the
wife (which has been indicated in some studies (e.g. Bankole and Sing 1998), but not
all), a strengthening of women’s decision-making autonom y is likely to reduce
fertility (see also M ason and Smith, 2000). This is particularly relevant for Africa,
where women are reckoned to be very subordinate in relation to their husband
(whereas wom en in South Asia typically suffer m ore from  a lack of physical and
economic autonom y). Besides, when a wife is considered more of an equal, the couple
may communicate better about contraception, and the husband may see clearer how
childbearing burdens the wife. On the other hand, a closer relationship may stimulate
sexual activity. As a final exam ple, wom en who them selves have a relatively inferior
position relative to men (and consider it unlikely that their daughters’ life will be very
different) may not only consider the childbearing costs generally low and the rewards
high, but expect boys to be even m ore useful than girls. Such boy preferences (which
are much less pronounced in Africa than in parts of Asia) will enhance fertility desires
in settings where fertility is not extremely high (see e.g. Cain 1993).
8The possible importance of others’ education
Several of the causally intermediate factors mentioned above may depend not only on
the woman’s own education, but also that of other women. As pointed out by, for
example, M ontgomery and Casterline (1996), other women m ay exert an effect
because of social learning, social influence and more indirect mechanisms. The
individual woman may learn directly from others by communication and observation.
It is not only factual knowledge that is likely to be transmitted, but also attitudes as
well as understanding of possible consequences of different actions. Bongaarts and
W atkins (1996) have stressed that this learning m ay include interpretation in light of
current local conditions and the individual situation. There may also be a more
passive imitation of behavior (‘social influence’) without any (active digestion of)
new knowledge, driven by a desire to attract other people’s approval. A more indirect
m echanism  is that others’ ideas, resources or behavior can influence society and
social institutions and thereby also behavior more generally.
In principle, these influential ‘others’ may be close neighbors, other wom en in
the village or city, or even women in other parts of the country, and they m ay be of
the same or a different age. In fact, there m ay even be spill-over effects from the
behavior and characteristics of adolescents and children. In this study, it is the
education of other women of reproductive age in the DHS cluster (i.e. the village
level; see below) that has been in focus.
To be more specific, uneducated women may have more knowledge of
contraception and more modern views about its acceptability if they live in a society
where many women have attended school for some years than if they live elsewhere.
They m ay also simply tend to imitate the more widespread use of contraception
am ong the better-educated. M oreover, their preference structure and their practice of
breastfeeding and post-partum abstinence m ay be influenced by aggregate education.
Other people’s education may be of importance also to those who themselves
have more education, although for slightly different reasons. A diffusion of factual
knowledge of contraception is, for example, less relevant, but there may be a more
efficient interpretation of the ideas and attitudes the better-educated have been
exposed to at school or through reading if there are more women to share these
experiences with.
9An argument advanced by Caldwell (1980) was that introduction of compulsory
education, which will lead to high enrollment rates in the country (‘mass education’),
is likely to reduce fertility by increasing parents’ costs of childbearing and
undermining the possibilities to make use of children’s work potential. One might add
that seeing m any children enrolled perhaps will make everyone more conscious about
the need to educate their offspring, regardless of legislation (see elaboration by Axinn
and Barber 2001). The latter argum ent would, of course, be relevant also for
aggregate education at a lower geographical level than the country. Another
particularly important point raised by Caldwell was that a generally high educational
level among adults and children alike (in the neighborhood or in a larger region)
might strengthen W estern middle class values, with more emphasis on individual
rights than on the duty to a larger family network. He thought that an increase in the
proportion with a few years of schooling (breadth of education), would be the most
crucial change, whereas the average length of education within this group (depth of
education) would be of less importance.
M oreover, opportunity costs of childbearing may depend on other people’s
education. Generally, having a high education will increase a woman’s chance of
finding a relatively well-paid job (where she cannot bring her children with her).
However, under the assumption of a fixed supply of such jobs, a high proportion of
well-educated women in the community will decrease her chance. To elaborate on
this, even women with a quite short education may be able to get into this niche in the
labor market when few have an education, whereas their situation would be little
different from  that of the uneducated when the average education is higher.
In addition to its influence through such a competition effect, aggregate
education is linked to the supply side. W hen more women are educated, the attitude
towards women’s work in the modern sector is likely to change, and more jobs that
are attractive to and suitable for these wom en m ay be created. Because of the inertia
of these processes, the availability and acceptability of jobs presumably depend more
on aggregate education some years before than on the current situation. Better-
educated wom en who are forerunners, in the sense that few had such high education
in the immediate past, may find it particularly difficult to make use of their schooling.
In other words, if the temporal dimension is disregarded for simplicity, it can be
concluded that a high average education may reduce the opportunity costs because of
a competition effect and add to them because of increased supply and acceptance of
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well-paid jobs. To complicate this further, opportunity costs may be substituted by
direct costs by purchasing child care, which is likely to be particularly cheap when
only a few wom en work away from home.
Of course, if a general rise in women’s education (with or without an
accompanying rise for men) contributes to undermine old ideas about women’s rights
and obligations compared to men, it is not only the opportunity costs of childbearing
that will be enhanced. An improvement of women’s status as a contextual
phenomenon, and the concomitant changes in women’s individual position, may
influence fertility for many other reasons, a few of which were reviewed above. This
may influence also the fertility of women who them selves have little education.
Besides, broader economic transformations are likely to take place as a result of
a better-educated work force, in the long run. In addition to the increase in the number
of well-paid jobs in the modern sector, as referred to above, it is possible, for
exam ple, that the agriculture will be generally modernized, including that am ong
uneducated farm ers. This will reduce children’s relative importance in the fields, and
thus the incentive for childbearing. M oreover, higher productivity in agriculture,
combined with a general knowledge level that may facilitate the establishing of
manufacturing industries that benefit particularly strongly from economies of scale,
may lead to an increased concentration of people in urban areas. In other words, it can
be argued that investments in education in an area m ay contribute to stimulate the
urbanization of that area, although slowly. Also the generally higher wealth that is
likely to be a part of these transformations may have an effect on fertility.
M acro- micro interactions
There may well be interactions between the individual and aggregate level. Some of
the effects of aggregate education that are suggested above are m ost likely to be felt
among wom en who themselves have little education, whereas others may be just as
strong, or even stronger, among those who have some education.
As yet, there is no clear empirical evidence about such interactions. Jejeebhoy
(1995) concluded that, in countries where wom en’s literacy is high, primary education
is more likely to push fertility down, and the negative effect of secondary education is
particularly sharp. This is, of course, the same as claiming that the literacy rate has the
clearest negative effect among the better-educated. Her conclusion was based on a
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review of a number of studies with different, and more or less relevant, control
variables included, and did therefore not have a very solid basis. She found, for
exam ple, that fertility desires responded most sharply to secondary education in the
countries with a generally low educational level, and that education was least
powerful in weakening the breastfeeding norm, which would contribute to a
particularly strong negative effect on fertility, in these settings. In the recent
Zim babwean study, effects of aggregate education on birth rates were generally weak,
regardless of individual education (Kravdal 2000). The  few other original multilevel
studies addressing such interactions have not left a clear picture (Lesthaeghe et al.
1985; Tienda et al.1985).
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Data
DHS data for the following countries and years are included: Benin 1996, Burkina
Faso 1999, Cameroon 1998, Central African Republic 1994, Chad 1996, Cote
d’Ivoire 1994, Comoros 1996, Ghana 1999, Kenya 1998, M adagascar 1997, M alawi
1992, M ali 1996, M ozambique 1997, Namibia 1992, Niger 1998, Rwanda 1992,
Senegal 1997, Tanzania 1996, Togo 1998, Uganda 1995, Zambia 1996, and
Zimbabwe 1994. Only the data for women are used.
These data include inform ation on the woman’s educational level at the time
of interview, whether her current place of residence has a rural or urban character, her
birth history, and various indicators of, for example, her status, wealth and religion.
The surveys have a clustered sample. In each of the 22 countries, 100-521
‘enum eration areas’ or ‘census tracks’ (or whatever they are called) have been
selected. They cover one or a few villages or settlements, a small town, or part of a
larger town or city. On average, 25 women from such an area have been included in
the sample, and constitute a cluster. In total, there are 5986 clusters in the 22
countries. Aggregate education is calculated at the cluster level by summarizing over
individual observations within this cluster. Some other cluster-level indicators are also
constructed.
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Hazard regression models
Discrete-time hazard regression models for the two years before the survey are
estimated. This limit is not critical. For exam ple, a four-year observation period gave
almost exactly the same estimates.
Each woman contributes a series of three-month observation intervals. Tests
showed this to be a sufficiently short interval. In the first-birth models, follow-up
starts at age 14 or two years before the survey, whichever came latest. After first birth,
multi-episode models for the transition into a higher parity level are estimated, with
observations running from the time of first birth or from two years before the survey.
(Such a ‘piecem eal’ approach has been criticized by e.g. Heckman and W alker
(1990), but a more advanced simultaneous modeling that includes unobservables
correlated over parity transitions is left to future studies).
Generally, one should be careful to include indicators of attitudes and
characteristics at interview in such m odels. This is because they m ay be different from
those earlier in the two-year period, and, even more critically, they m ay partly be a
response to births. Fortunately, educational level is not a very problematic variable. In
principle, the relatively low fertility that is found during the two preceding years
among, for example, women who reported at interview that they had taken some
secondary education, does not only reflect a causal effect of such factors as the skills
obtained at secondary school. It may also reflect that pregnancy or childbirth among
those with less education have inhibited their entry into or continuation of secondary
school. However, only estimates from first-birth models suffer from such a
simultaneity bias, and only at certain ages and for certain educational levels. For
example, the estimated effects of a short secondary education will be biased only for
early teenage years, when attending the first part of secondary school is still an option.
Prim ary education takes place too early to be influenced by childbearing, and higher-
order birth models are not hampered by such problems, because, at this stage, few
women would take further education anyway. It was experimented with models where
both enrollment and educational level (lagged one year) were included as time-
varying variables, on the basis of an assumption that school attendance is continuous
from age 6, with no repetition. This gave slightly weaker effects of secondary
education, but otherwise the same estimates.
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An account of the weighting procedure and a discussion of the need to include
a community-level random term can be found in Appendix 1.
Definition of education
Five categories are defined for women’s individual education, according to the
number of years completed: i) no education or an incomplete primary education
lasting less than 3 years, ii) incomplete primary education of longer length (3-6
years), iii) complete primary education or incomplete secondary education of less than
2 years (i.e. 7-8 years in total), iv) 2-3 years of secondary education (i.e. 9-10 years in
total), and v) secondary education of 4 or more years (i.e. 11+ years in total).4
The m ain m easure of aggregate education is the average num ber of years at
school among women of reproductive age in the cluster. (W hen the woman in focus
was excluded, the estimates were not perceptibly different).
In addition, some models are estimated for women in clusters where at least
one woman had three or more years of education (about 90 percent of the total
sample). These models include both the proportion of wom en with at least three years
of education and the average level within this group. (Separation of effects is not
difficult, given the size of the data and a correlation of only about 0.6).
These aggregate m easures of education are obviously linked with the average
age of the wom en in the cluster, but inclusion of such an age variable turned out to be
completely unimportant for the estimates.
The impact of leaving aggregate education out of the model
W hen models for individual fertility are estimated (from surveys, registers or census
data) with the intention of assessing the impact of education, aggregate education is
hardly ever considered. This can be a serious misspecification.  W hen only individual
education is included in the model, part of the aggregate effect is captured, but not the
entire. An em pirical exam ple of this will be given below. It is also easy to show
mathematically for a simple linear regression model (see Appendix 2), but not for a
hazard regression model.
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Also the consequences of including aggregate education exclusively are
addressed in Appendix 2 and below.
Controls for determinants of education
A number of factors are likely to influence both education and fertility, and should
therefore be included as control variables. The urban/rural character of the place of
residence is one such variable. The more advanced econom y in cities requires an
educated work force and allows investm ents, and educational returns to these
investments may be high because of the higher population density. M ore precisely,
having grown up in an urban area may have influenced the woman’s educational
level, as well as that of other women who lived there. Besides, the degree of
urbanization in the community where she lived at interview must have had a bearing
on the general educational level there, which may also be of importance for her
behavior. The Zimbabwean study referred above clearly showed that it was very
important to control for urbanization, and that the results were sensitive to the choice
of urban-rural variable (Kravdal 2000). In this study, it is the urban/rural character of
place where the wom an lived at interview that is used. This is the variable that had the
most pronounced impact in the Zimbabwean study.
One cannot completely rule out the possibility of a reverse relationship. As
pointed out above, the aggregate level of schooling may fuel urbanization in the long
run. Similarly, a woman’s own education may make migration to a city more
attractive to her (see further discussion below). If these effects are of any quantitative
importance, it means that the total effects of investments in education are more
strongly negative than indicated by the estimates shown here (given the signs of the
urbanization and education effects, and the positive education-urbanization
correlation).
Religion is probably quite stable over a person’s life and more likely to
influence than be influenced by education, although the latter is not completely
implausible. However, model experimentation showed that its inclusion was without
importance for education effect estimates.
The causal position of other variables available in the data is more diffuse. The
woman’s own wealth and autonom y, as reported at interview, may be among the
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consequences of her education, and also be linked with factors that have determined
her education, such as e.g. the economic resources of her family of origin and their
attitudes to women. Besides, they m ay have been influenced by fertility during the
two previous years. These variables have therefore not been included at the individual
level.
Inclusion of corresponding aggregate-level variables is less problematic. The
causal position vis-a-vis aggregate education is, of course, just as ambiguous.
However, these factors are at least not the result of the woman’s own education, and,
more importantly, they are not the result of her fertility (disregarding migration, as
briefly discussed below).
Two of the aggregate-level variables included in the models are rough
indicators of women’s status in the community: Proportion of women who report boy
preferences (ideal number of sons larger than ideal number of daughters), and
proportion of working women who do not participate in decisions about how to spend
the money they earn. The following are indicators of wealth and economic
modernization: The proportion who have electricity, the average score on a wealth
indicator (0-2 depending on possession of some consumer items), and the proportion
of husbands who work in the agricultural sector. In addition, there are three religiosity
indicators: proportion who are M uslim, proportion with a traditional religion, and
proportion who are neither Christian, M uslim nor traditionalists.
Besides, country is included to capture various characteristics at the national
level that may have a bearing on both fertility and education.
M igration as a complicating factor
The aggregate variables considered in this study refer to the place where the wom an
lived at interview. This is particularly problem atic if (lack of) migration is partly
determ ined by an expected or actual birth. For exam ple, som e people m ay rem ain in a
rural or poorly developed area if they have a child, perhaps to be in close contact with
kin. In principle, this could be handled by a simultaneous modeling of fertility and
migration, but the data do not contain sufficient information for this.
M oreover, the effects of aggregate education, net of individual education, are
not only confounded by unobserved aggregate characteristics, but also by unobserved
16
individual characteristics, because of selective migration. For example, poorly
educated women who have moved to a place where the general educational level is
high may be different from the poorly educated who have rem ained in a place where
few are educated.
Simulations
M onte Carlo simulations are performed to see how changes in the educational
distribution affect total fertility. Birth histories are generated for 50000 women in a
given educational category. This was experimentally proved to be a sufficiently large
simulation sample. Starting at age 14, a 3-month birth log odd, easily transform ed into
a probability, is predicted for each woman every third month on the basis of
characteristics at the beginning of the three-month interval and model estimates. A
birth is ascribed to the woman within the interval if a random number with a uniform
distribution over [0,1] is less than the calculated probability. The average number of
births before age 45 in this sample is the simulated education-specific total fertility
(for simplicity, also shorter terms for this are used below). W hen this is done for all
five educational categories, an average sim ulated total fertility can be calculated. (See
below for further details)
(

M ain effects of individual and aggregate education
According to a model that includes only age, individual education and country, a
woman’s education strongly reduces her first-birth rate (M odel 1, Panel A, Table 1).
This effect is considerably weaker when urbanization is included (M odel 2).
Increases in the average educational level are found to push fertility down, net
of individual education and urbanization: An additional year reduces first-birth log
odds by 0.064 (M odel 4). Besides, the inclusion of this variable reduces the effect of
individual education. Stated differently, the effect of individual education in a simpler
m odel captures part of the aggregate effect (but, as show below, not the entire).
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W ithout control for urbanization, the aggregate effect is, of course, stronger (M odel
3).
(Table 1 about here)
Sim ilar patterns, but generally weaker education effects, are seen for higher-
order births (Panel B). The exception is that a few years of education does not reduce
fertility when aggregate education is included.
These effects of community education are markedly different from those
estimated for Zimbabwe, where inclusion of the same urbanization variable as here
completely eliminated the aggregate effects (Kravdal, 2000). One reason for this is
that the Zimbabwean study was based on aggregate census data for 70 districts rather
than DHS-based aggregate measures for 230 clusters. Effects at that level may be
weaker, for exam ple because of longer average distance to the influential ’others’.
This idea is supported empirically. W hen a separate analysis was done with the
Zimbabwean data and it was aggregated up to the district level (identified on request
by Central Bureau of Statistics, Harare), using DHS data exclusively, the effects of
aggregate education reported by Kravdal (2000) were nicely replicated (not shown).
W hen it was aggregated up to the cluster level, however, average education had an
almost significant negative effect on first births, whereas there were no indications of
an effect for higher-order births (not shown). Unfortunately, it would be very time-
consuming to get an identification of the equivalent of the Zimbabwean district for all
countries. As a simpler check, a measure of average education in provinces (of which
there are nine in each country on average) was instead included in a model for all 22
countries pooled. The effects were about half the size of those estimated for cluster-
level education, although clearly significant. This lends further support to the idea that
effects are stronger at a lower level.
The differences that rem ain when the sam e statistical approach is used are not
easily explained. Country-specific analyses revealed a lack of significant effects for
both first-and higher–order births in only a few other countries than Zimbabwe, and
they have apparently little in common.  For Zimbabwe (but not all of the others), one
m ight suspect a relatively weak effect of an additional year of aggregate education
because the level is already generally high. However, such a pattern does not appear
in the data. W hereas the first-birth log odds decline sharply with increasing aggregate
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education at very low levels, and display an irregular pattern at high levels, the
higher-order birth rates are more negatively influenced by average education at high
than at low levels (Panel A, Table 2).5
(Table 2 about here)
In light of Caldwell’s hypothesis, it is interesting to see significant effects of
both breadth and depth of education, for first – as well as higher-order births (Panel B,
Table 2).
M acro-micro interactions
Significant macro-micro interaction effects are found (Panel C, Table 2). For first
births, a higher general level of education has the sharpest depressing effect among
women who them selves have less than three years of schooling. The pattern at higher
educational levels is not clear, except that the weakest impact of average education is
estimated for those with at least four years of secondary education. However, the
effect is significant even at that level (not shown).
The opposite is found for higher-order births: The effect of aggregate
education is sharpest for women with 2-3 years of secondary education, and weakest
for those with less than three years of primary education.
It can be shown by simulation that the interaction effects for higher-order
births dominate. As a conclusion, an additional year of aggregate education reduces
total fertility regardless of the woman’s own education, but less markedly so for the
poorly educated. Conversely, her own education generally exerts a monotonic
negative effect, except at the lowest level of aggregate education. For example, when
the average is less than one year, the higher-order birth rate is higher for wom en with
3-6 years of education than for the less educated, and this is not fully offset by the
lower first-birth rate.
Inclusion of other aggregate variables
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W hen aggregate indicators of wealth, economic modernization, religion and women’s
status are included, the effect of average education on first-birth rates is reduced to
less than half its size in the simpler models (Table 1, M odel 6). The effect on higher-
order birth rates is reduced by 1/5. As pointed out above, these variables may, to some
extent, be considered causally prior to education. The interpretation is then that the
existence of many educated women in the neighborhood is the result of community
characteristics that would have reduced fertility anyway, and that the true impact of
investments in education (through the aggregate-level effect) is weaker than indicated
in the simpler model. If additional indicators of these factors, or indicators of other
potential sources of spuriousness, had been available, even weaker effects of
aggregate education might have been estimated. On the other hand, the opposite
causality is also possible, in which case part of the total effect of aggregate education
will be tapped out by including such variables.
Implications for total fertility
The impact on total fertility of an educational expansion, according to different
models, is assessed by comparing simulated total fertility in one sub-population with
that in another where the educational distribution is different. For each sub-
population, simulated total fertility is the weighted average of the simulated
education-specific total fertility for the five educational categories, with weights equal
to the proportions of women in these five categories.
The simulations are based on predicted birth log odds. Such predictions (for
any level of the other variables) can be made, for example, for urban areas in a
particular country by setting the corresponding country dumm y and the urbanization
dumm y to 1. However, fertility measures that can be considered reasonably
representative of the entire region are preferred, so the country dummies are set to the
proportions living in the respective countries (according to population statistics), and
the urbanization dumm y is set to the proportion living in urban areas (according to a
summation over the DHS surveys). This is not a critical choice. If other values had
been chosen, all log odds would simply have been higher or lower by an additive
constant. The patterns of educational differences, which are of interest here, would
have been the same.
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As a first illustration of the differences between models with and without
aggregate education, fertility is simulated as described above for three populations
which have the educational distribution observed for i) these 22 countries on average,
ii) Kenya, or iii) Chad. These two countries have the highest and lowest average
educational level among the 22 countries (6.9 and 0.8 years, respectively, whereas the
22-country average is 3.8).
 W hen aggregate education is left out of the models (M odel 2, Table 1), the
simulated education-specific total fertility is 6.04, 5.79, 5.23, 4.22 and 3.36, for the
five categories, which gives an average of 5.55 when the 22-country distribution is
used.6 Using instead the educational distribution for Kenya reduces fertility to 5.03.
W hen aggregate education is included (M odel 4, Table 1), almost the same
fertility (5.53) is, of course, simulated as a 22-country average. However, the levels
simulated for the different educational groups (5.85, 5.83, 5.37, 4.50 and 3.69) differ
less. If a new average is calculated from these education-specific levels with the
Kenyan educational distribution as weights, total fertility becomes only 0.38 lower.
However, when it is taken into account that the average length of education is higher
in Kenya, fertility in all educational categories is reduced (to 5.21, 5.18, 4.75, 3.90,
and 3.15), and average fertility thus becom es 1.00 lower.
To summarize, an expansion of overall education in the 22 countries up to the
current level in Kenya would reduce average total fertility in the region by 0.52
according to a m odel where only individual education is included (along with som e
obvious control variables). According to a model where also the community average
is included, the drop in total fertility would be 1.00, of which 0.38 is a purely
individual effect.
This also illustrates that a relatively small part of the aggregate effect is picked
up by the individual-level variable in the simplest model.
Similarly, in a hypothetical situation where education in the 22 countries is
reduced to the level in Chad, fertility would increase by 0.42 according to the simplest
model, and 0.91 when aggregate education is included, of which 0.28 is the individual
contribution.
A model including only the aggregate education, and not the individual,
captures the entire impact of education, but of course without providing any
information about the individual and aggregate contributions (M odel 5, Table 1).
According to simulations based on such a model, expansion to the level in Kenya
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would reduce fertility by 1.05, and contraction to the level in Chad would increase it
by 0.93.
A more conservative assessment can be obtained by using estimates from a
model where also various other structural variables are included (M odel 6, Table 1).
The result of this simulation is that expansion of education up to the Kenyan level
would lead to a drop of 0.75 in total fertility, whereas a contraction to the level in
Chad would give an increase of 0.69.
As a second illustration of the differences between the models, fertility is
simulated for nine different educational distributions that correspond to average
education of approximately 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 years (see detailed account in
notes to Figure 1). The simulations are done as described above, except that aggregate
education (when included) is entered as a 10-category variable along with a macro-
micro interaction (specified as in Table 2). The reason for this complexity is that the
main effects of aggregate education were shown above to deviate somewhat from
linearity, and that macro-micro interactions were found to be significant (although
with patterns for first and higher-order births that to some extent are opposites).
(Figure 1 about here)
Total fertility simulated from a purely individual model declines
monotonically from 6.02 to 4.93 across the nine settings, with a change that is most
pronounced at the highest educational levels (see Figure 1). For example, an increase
from 1 to 4 years of average education has a smaller impact (0.38) than an increase
from 4 to 7 (0.62).
Almost the same pattern is seen when aggregate education and the macro-
micro interaction are included, except that differences are generally more pronounced.
There is no difference between 0 and 1 year of average education, but an increase
from 1 to 4 years reduces fertility by 0.77, and an increase from 4 to 7 reduces it by
1.26. (If the interaction had been taken out and the aggregate effect specified as linear,
total fertility would have declined also at very low levels of education, but the pattern
would otherwise differ very little).
If total fertility is plotted by the proportion with at least three years of
schooling, rather than  the average length of education (as in Figure 1), the increasing
steepness of the education-fertility curve appears somewhat clearer. There is no
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m arked turning-point, tough. This sheds some doubt on the idea suggested by
Caldwell, and recently acclaimed by Lloyd, Kaufman and Hewett (2000) on the basis
of African country-level data, that there is almost a threshold, at a very high level of
primary schooling, for the onset of fertility decline. Admittedly, a cross-sectional
study such as this is not the perfect background for discussing possible triggers of
fertility transition. However, when fertility is markedly lower in populations where,
say, 60%  have more than three years of education, than in populations where the
corresponding proportion is 10% , it is not unlikely that the former have experienced a
decline, which may have started at levels already below 60% .7
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Univariate tabulations of total fertility rate by the individual woman’s educational
level, such as those routinely produced in DHS country reports, give a poor
impression of the impact that investments in education would have on fertility. One
reason is that the urban background of the better-educated is not taken into account. It
is shown in this study that effects of a woman’s education on her first- and higher-
order birth rates are considerably reduced when urbanization is included (in addition
to education, age, parity, duration since last birth, and country).
On the other hand, there is good news for those who hope to see demographic
effects of education: In this analysis of 22 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the
average educational level in the com m unity (DHS cluster) has a significant depressing
effect on a woman’s birth rates, above and beyond that of her own education. Such
theoretically plausible spill-over effects from other people’s education, which have
not been seen in previous studies, m ore than com pensate for the attenuation of effects
that results from a control for urbanization.
Com m unity education exerts an effect for the uneducated and the better-
educated alike, although slightly sharper effects are seen for the latter. It is also found
that both the proportion with at least three years of education and the average level
within this group are of importance. The effects of individual and aggregate education
may, of course, differ across this vast region, because of political, cultural, economic
or other variations. However, a check of such interactions is beyond the scope of this
analysis.
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A simulation based on a model where aggregate education is included reveals
that average fertility for the 22 countries would have been 1.00 lower if education had
been expanded from the level currently observed in the region to that in Kenya. Only
0.38 of this is an individual effect. If only individual education is included in the
model, some of the aggregate effect is captured, but only a quite small part.
Simulations show a drop in fertility of no more than 0.52.
 Inclusion of aggregate education exclusively would have given the same
estimates of the total impact of expansion. This does not mean, of course, that it
would be wise to aggregate up available individual data with the intention of
perform ing a purely ecological analysis. It m erely illustrates that a researcher with
access only to aggregate data, for example from censuses, might be quite well
equipped to trace such total effects, had it not been for the usually poorer fertility
measures in such data, and often more limited number of potential control variables.
According to the most complex model, which includes both individual and
aggregate education quite finely categorized, as well as an interaction (of modest
importance) between them, fertility will decline monotonically as more people are
offered an education. The decline is steeper at high than at low levels, but no
threshold can be discerned.
An important question is whether structural factors other than urbanization can
be responsible for the aggregate effects. As an attempt to check this, some indicators
of economic modernization, religion and wom en’s general status in the community
were included in the models. This reduced the aggregate effects appreciably, down to
about the size of the individual effects. Because some of these indicators (and in fact
also urbanization) to some extent may be consequences rather than determinants of
education, one may argue that this is a conservative estimate of the total effect of
education. On the other hand, there may be variations in modernization and women’s
status that are not captured by the included variables. Besides, factors not considered
at all (for lack of data) may be a source of spuriousness. Such factors could be the
political attitudes in the area, the competence of the local government (e.g. in building
schools and providing good outlets for contraception), or even certain individual
characteristics (see discussion of selective migration above). In that case, the
aggregate effects may just as well be smaller than suggested above.
Also individual-level effects of education may, of course, be biased because of
unobserved factors (at aggregate or individual level). Therefore, even though the true
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effects of aggregate education m ay be weaker than indicated here, their im portance
relative to the individual effects is not necessarily less. The fact that the controls in
this study are not perfect should not be taken to undermine the conclusion that
community education deserves attention in future assessments of the importance of
schooling for fertility decline.
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Good comments from Nico Keilman and encouraging signals from John Caldwell are
strongly appreciated, but any shortcomings are, of course, the responsibility of the
author.
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W eighting
The clusters in the DHS data are assumed to be representative of the population at a
higher level (e.g. province or a combination of province and rural/urban), but the
distribution over these higher-level units is not as in the actual population. W eights
are therefore defined in the data.
To obtain estimates that are representative of the situation in the 22 countries
on the whole, the province-specific weights referred to above are in this study
multiplied by country-specific weights that reflect the relative size of the country
populations compared to the relative size of the country samples. However, a purely
province-specific weighting gave almost the same results.
M ultilevel models
Individuals in the same cluster may share some unobserved characteristics, which
means that standard assumptions in regression analysis about independent
observations are not reasonable. So-called multilevel models have been developed to
handle these problems, and have been applied in many demographic research projects
the last few years. In this study, random terms at the cluster-level were added to the
constant term in a first-birth model to check the robustness of the most important
estimates. M ore precisely, the probability pij of having a first child for individual i in
cluster j is given by
log (pij / (1-pij)) = + *,+ - ,+ uj ,
where+ is the effect of a vector of individual characteristics *,, and - is the effect of
cluster characteristics ,. The unobserved factors are represented by the random term
uj, which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0. The estimation was done
in M LwiN (Goldstein et al 1998).
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As shown in Appendix Table 1, estimates differed very little between the
M LwiN model and the corresponding ordinary logistic model. The latter is therefore
preferred, for practical reasons. Unfortunately, a higher-order birth model could not
be estimated in M LwiN due to size constraints.
(Appendix table A1 about here)
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It is shown here that, when the number of births is given by a very simple linear
model, the exclusion of the aggregate variable will produce an individual effect
estimate that is the sum of the true individual and part of the true aggregate effect.
Assume that the number of births Fij to a woman i in a district j (e.g. village or
province) is given by
(1) Fij = a0 + a1 Uij + a2 Pj* + e ij ,
where Uij is a 0/1 variable for education (e.g. less than three years of schooling vs.
three or more years) and Pj* is the proportion of wom en with Uij = 1 in district j. e ij is
an independent norm ally distributed error term . According to this model, an increase
in the proportion with Uij = 1 in a district from p1 to p2 will increase fertility by
a1 (p2 – p1 ) +  a2 (p2 – p1 ) =  (a1 +  a2) (p2 – p1 ).
Assume that a sample of size Njis taken from each district j, and that the
following model is estimated from this sample (N is the sum of all Nj) :
(2)  Fij = b0 + b1 Uij  + e ij .
The least-squares estimator b1^  for b1 is
(3) b1^   = (Σij FijΣij Uij  - N Σij (FijUij))/( (Σij Uij) (Σij Uij) – N Σij (Uij Uij))
Assume now that, as usual, the expectation values E Σij eij = 0, E Σij eijUij = 0
and E Σij eijPj = 0, and that Pj = ΣiUij  / Nj for the sample is equal to the Pj*for the
district. Using equation (1) for F, with Pj*=Pj, in the expression (3) yields
E b1^   = a1 + a2 c,
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where
c = (Σij PjΣij Uij - N ΣijPjUij) / (ΣijUij ΣijUij - N ΣijUijUij) =  (P P- P P ) / (P(1-P)),
which means that 0 < c < 1, unless all Pj are equal. (P and PP are the m ean values,
defined by  P
 = ΣjPjNj/ N  and PP = ΣjPjPjNj/ N.)
In these calculations, the following relationships have been used:
ΣijUij  = ΣijUij Uij = ΣijPj = ΣjNjPj
ΣijUij Pj = Σij Pj Pj = ΣjNjPjPj
To conclude, the predicted response to an increase in the proportion with Uij = 1 from
p1 to p2 , according to this purely individual m odel, is (a1 +  a2 c) (p2 – p1 ), which is
less than the true response.
If, instead, the individual variable U is left out, the model to estimate becomes:
(4)  Fij = b0 + b2 Pj  + e ij .
Calculations corresponding to those shown above, and with the same assumptions,
give the result that
E b2^   = a1 + a2.
Thus, by estimating a model including aggregate education exclusively, one captures
the entire response to an increase in the proportion with Uij = 1.
If the error term had been separated into an individual-level and a district-level
contribution, the conclusions would have been the sam e.
(To the publisher: If possible, the b1^  and b2^  should be printed with the ^ above b,
and  P and PP should be printed with the  above P and PP).
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1
 Theoretically, this income effect is relevant also in settings where children are net
economic contributors in the long run, because costs at a young age must be covered
(in the absence of well-functioning capital m arkets or fostering arrangem ents).
However, a positive effect often fails to appear in em pirical studies of any society.
W hile a higher incom e may stimulate the demand for children, given quality
requirements, the latter may also be sensitive to income.
2
 There may also be an effect of enrollment itself, because it signals educational
goals. For example, women in secondary school may prefer not to have a child yet,
because a birth would make it more difficult to complete the education, with
implications not least for life-time income.
3
 However, education will not necessarily contribute to improve wom en’s status. For
example, it has been shown in some Asian countries that the uneducated actually m ay
have more freedom of movement than the better-educated (e.g. Balk 1994).
4 The three-year limit is chosen because a majority of the students are literate by
then.
5
 There is a striking resemblance with the pattern in the individual effects. Perhaps a
woman’s higher-order birth rate is particularly high not only if she herself has a few
years of primary education, but also if she lives in areas where many others have such
a level of schooling, which is particularly likely to be the case if the average is quite
low.
6
 This figure is, of course, not exactly equal to the average over the period total
fertility rates reported in DHS country publications. The latter are based on a
summation over age-specific birth rates, whereas the figure calculated here is from a
more complex model.
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7
 Lloyd et al. focused on teenage education, and found in a univariate analysis that
increases in the proportion with four or more years of schooling had a much more
inhibiting effect on fertility when a level of about 75 percent was already reached,
than at lower levels (although the latter effect was not negligible). In the present
study, such a m arked turning point fails to appear also when the nine settings are
defined according to the proportion teenagers with more than four years of education,
with category limits in steps of 0.1. M oreover, when teenage aggregate education is
included in the models instead of the education among women in all reproductive
ages, effects are generally weaker and not particularly sharp at high levels. Thus, it
does not seem  that the use of adult rather than teenage education has m asked a
threshold effect.
Figure 1. Sim ulated total fertility2, according to two different m odels
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Notes to Figure 1
1
 The value 0 corresponds to an average education in the range [0,1), 1 corresponds to [1,2), and so forth. The educational
distribution among all women in DHS clusters where the average education is [0,1), the educational distribution among all
wom en in DHS clusters where the average education is the [1,2), and correspondingly for higher averages, up to [8,9), are as
follows:
Average length 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
(years)
Proportion of
wom en with
education
    0-2  years 0.943 0.748 0.586 0.442 0.319 0.217 0.142 0.084 0.053
    3-6  years 0.051 0.205 0.297 0.352 0.368 0.335 0.276 0.224 0.167
    7-8  years 0.004 0.031 0.079 0.140 0.207 0.291 0.330 0.332 0.271
    9-10 years 0.002 0.014 0.027 0.047 0.072 0.099 0.152 0.200 0.246
    11-  years 0.000 0.003 0.011 0.020 0.035 0.058 0.099 0.160 0.262
 2
 Average number of births during reproductive ages is simulated for 50000 women in each of the 5 educational categories. In
the predictions of birth log odds, average education is not set to 0,1, … 8, but 0.5, 1.5… , 8.5. To obtain figures representative for
the 22 countries, the country dummies are set to the proportions living in the respective countries, and the urbanization dummy is
set to the proportion living in urban areas. (See text for further comments on this.) ’Simulated total fertility’ is the weighted
average of these 5 education-specific averages, with the educational distributions shown in note 1 as weights.
3
 The model includes age, duration since last previous birth (not for first birth), parity (not for first birth), urbanization , country,
and individual education, with the same categories as described in Table 1.
4
 The model includes the same variables as described in note 3, plus aggregate education and an interaction between individual
and aggregate education as described in Table 2.
Table 1. Estimates (log odds) from discrete-time hazard models for first- and higher-order births based on DHS data for 22
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for the 1990s.
PANEL A:  First births1
M odel 1 M odel 2 M odel 3 M odel 4 M odel 5 M odel 6
W OM AN’S EDUCATION
0-2   years2  0  0  0  0  0
3-6   years -0.22*** -0.16*** -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.09***
7-8   years -0.38*** -0.29*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.17***
9-10 years -0.78*** -0.65*** -0.51*** -0.50*** -0.49***
11-   years -1.14*** -0.96*** -0.81*** -0.79*** -0.77***
URBAN VS. RURAL -0.32*** -0.18*** -0.21*** -0.01
AVERAGE LENGTH OF  EDUCATION
(years) -0.085*** -0.064*** -0.107*** -0.024***
PROPORTION  W ITH BOY PREFERENCES -0.04
PROPORTION OF W ORKING W OM EN NOT DECIDING OVER M ONEY THEY EARN  0.04
AVERAGE SCORE ON  W EALTH INDICATOR (0-2)  0.08***
PROPORTION W HO HAVE ELECTRICITY -0.44***
PROPORTION OF M ARRIED W OM EN W ITH HUSBAND IN AGRICULTURE  0.23***
PROPORTION M USLIM   0.10**
PROPORTION OTHER RELIGION OR NO RELIGION  0.34***
PROPORTION TRADITIONAL RELIGION  0.01
PANEL B :  Higher-order births3
M odel 1 M odel 2 M odel 3 M odel 4 M odel 5 M odel 6
W OM AN’S EDUCATION
0-2   years2  0  0  0  0  0
3-6   years -0.05*** -0.01  0.03*  0.02  0.02
7-8   years -0.16*** -0.10*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05***
9-10 years -0.33*** -0.23*** -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.15***
11-   years -0.50*** -0.37*** -0.31*** -0.29*** -0.28***
URBAN VS. RURAL -0.27*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.14***
AVERAGE LENGTH OF  EDUCATION
(years) -0.053*** -0.030*** -0.041*** -0.024***
PROPORTION  W ITH BOY PREFERENCES  0.13***
PROPORTION OF W ORKING W OM EN NOT DECIDING OVER M ONEY THEY EARN  0.18***
AVERAGE SCORE ON  W EALTH INDICATOR (0-2)  0.09***
PROPORTION W HO HAVE ELECTRICITY -0.21***
PROPORTION OF M ARRIED W OM EN W ITH HUSBAND IN AGRICULTURE  0.09***
PROPORTION M USLIM  -0.13***
PROPORTION OTHER RELIGION OR NO RELIGION  0.03
PROPORTION TRADITIONAL RELIGION -0.08*
_                                                                                                                                                                                                     _
1
 Also age (7 categories) and  country (22 categories) were included in the models. Indicators for missing information were
included in  M odel 6, but without being important for other estimates. There were 12461 first births in 415986 3-month intervals.
2
 Arbitrarily chosen reference category.
3
 Also age (7 categories),  duration since last previous birth (6 categories),  parity (6 categories), and country (22 categories) were
included in the models. Indicators for missing information were included in  M odel 6, but without being important for other
estimates. There were 46398 higher-order births in 935277  3-month intervals.
*     significant at the 0.10 level;  **   significant at the 0.05 level;  *** significant at the 0.01 level
Table 2. Estimates (log odds) from discrete-time hazard models for first- and higher-order births based on DHS data for 22
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for the 1990s.
PANEL A:  Estimates from models where  aggregate education is categorized
First births1 Higher-order
births3
W OM AN’S EDUCATION
0-2   years2  0  0
3-6   years -0.08***  0.00
7-8   years -0.19*** -0.06***
9-10 years -0.52*** -0.17***
11-   years -0.81*** -0.27***
(integer part of)
AVERAGE LENGTH OF EDUCATION
0   year  0.26*** -0.00
1   year  0.16***  0.02
2   years  0.01  0.04*
3   years2  0  0
4   years -0.05 -0.04**
5    years -0.08** -0.07***
6    years -0.08* -0.11***
7    years -0.25*** -0.18***
8    years -0.19*** -0.24***
9 or more years -0.38*** -0.31***
PANEL B: Estimates from models including measures of both depth and breadth of education (only for women in clusters where
at least one woman had 3 or more years of education)
First births1 Higher-order
births3
W OM AN’S EDUCATION
0-2   years2  0.00  0.00
3-6   years -0.09***  0.01
7-8   years -0.16*** -0.06***
9-10 years -0.49*** -0.17***
11-   years -0.78*** -0.29***
PROPORTION OF W OM EN
W ITH 3 OR M ORE YEARS OF 
EDUCATION -0.27*** -0.12***
AVERAGE LENGTH OF
EDUCATION AM ONG W OM EN
W ITH 3 OR M ORE YEARS
OF EDUCATION (years) -0.065*** -0.025***
PANEL C: Estimates from models including an interaction between individual and aggregate education.
First births1 Higher-order
births3
W OM AN’S EDUCATION
0-2   years2  0  0
3-6   years -0.06* -0.01
7-8   years -0.15*** -0.06***
9-10 years -0.48*** -0.12***
11-   years -0.83*** -0.27***
AVERAGE LENGTH OF EDUCATION
(years) -0.082*** -0.013***
INTERACTION:
W OM AN’S EDUCATION * AVERAGE
LENGTH OF EDUCATION (years) – 4
0-2   years* (average – 4)  0  0
3-6   years * (average – 4)  0.026** -0.023***
7-8   years * (average – 4)  0.021 -0.034***
9-10  years * (average – 4)  0.027* -0.049***
11-    years * (average – 4)  0.039** -0.032***
_                                                                                                                                                                                                     _
1
 Also age (7 categories), urbanization, and  country (22 categories) were included in the models.
2
 Arbitrarily chosen reference category.
3
 Also age (7 categories),  duration since last previous birth (6 categories),  parity (6 categories), urbanization, and  country (22
categories) were included in the models.
*     significant at the 0.10 level; **   significant at the 0.05 level;  *** significant at the 0.01 level
Appendix Table 1. Estimates (log odds), with standard errors,  from discrete-time hazard models for first births based on DHS
data for 22 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for the 1990s 1
2-level model estimated Ordinary
in M LwiN with a 1st order logistic
M QL algorithm 3 m odel estimated
in SAS
Estimate Standard Estimate Standard
error error
W OM AN’S EDUCATION
0-2   years2  0  0
3-6   years -0.096 (0.026) -0.094 (0.026)
7-8   years -0.181 (0.031) -0.181 (0.031)
9-10 years -0.516 (0.043) -0.504 (0.042)
11-   years -0.795 (0.046) -0.790 (0.046)
AVERAGE LENGTH OF EDUCATION
(years) -0.067 (0.0065) -0.064 (0.0060)
URBAN VS. RURAL -0.175 (0.031) -0.180 (0.026)
VARIANCE AT THE CLUSTER LEVEL  0.036 (0.006)
_                                                                                                                                                                                                     _
1
 Also age and country were included, as described in  Table 1.
2
 Arbitrarily chosen reference category
3
 Very similar results were obtained with 2nd order PQL algorithm.
